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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and reformers should resist the temptation to encapsulate 
the problem of corruption in the “developing” world as strictly one 
of bureaucratic breakdown or of decay in the rule of law. Such 
approaches limit policy options to a series of superficial choices 
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which normally do not have lasting effects. The first step towards 
building a long-term solution to corruption is to understand acts of 
corruption as symptoms of a deeper problem in the relationship 
between state and society in general and in the functioning of 
democracy in particular. 
The objective of this article is to insert the discussion of anti-
corruption policies within broader debates on accountability, 
democracy, and human rights. In Part II, this article begins by 
offering a new, expansive definition of accountability, which breaks 
with minimalist, bureaucratic versions of the concept. It also address 
the failings of elections as pro-accountability mechanisms and 
derives from this discussion the need for the development of policy 
strategies designed to directly attack corruption as such. 
In Part III, this article then explores the diversity of pro-
accountability strategies available. Specifically, it examines the costs 
and benefits of what I call “Weberian” and “marketization” 
strategies, linked respectively to the “old” and “new” public 
management approaches. It also explores innovative recent strategies 
based on the creation of specialized independent agencies and the 
development of “social accountability” initiatives. 
In Part IV, this article defends the importance of society-based 
approaches as a means to reinvigorate anti-corruption policy. It 
examines the various dimensions along which such approaches can 
vary and points out that not all civil society approaches are equally 
effective. Many society-based initiatives can easily get trapped in the 
same bureaucratic and legalistic traps as more traditional approaches. 
This article argues that the best way to avoid this slippage is to 
ground society-based strategies in a “human rights approach” to 
development. Finally, it concludes with some general thoughts on the 
broader challenges of anti-corruption strategies and their relationship 
to the advancement of democracy and human rights. 
II.  CONSTRUCTING ACCOUNTABILITY 
It is generally accepted that the best way to combat corruption and 
thereby guarantee the public interest nature of the state is by 
strengthening government accountability.1 But what exactly does this 
 
 1.  ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2001) 
  
2014] RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION 295 
concept mean? In its most literal sense, the term “account-ability” 
means little more than the “ability” or the “possibility” that someone 
or something can be “accounted for” or “counted up.”2 Under this 
minimalist understanding, all that the accountability of government 
would require is the most basic form of bookkeeping (for example, 
this many miles of highway were built last year, this much money 
was spent, this number of students attended public schools, etc.). It 
might also require the existence of someone who could possibly view 
the accounts if he or she so wished, a principle of “minimal 
exposure” if you will, but not much else. Transparency, punishment, 
performance, corruption, external surveillance, the public interest, 
power, and principal-agent relationships are all left out of this basic 
understanding of the concept of accountability. 
Such a definition is clearly insufficient. Basic bookkeeping plus 
minimal exposure are not powerful enough levers to generate 
positive feedback cycles of expanding accountability. If my 
colleague at the Public Works Ministry knows that I built 300 miles 
of highway last year, would this in itself promote good governance? 
What if my 300 miles were made out of below standard concrete? 
What if the budget had called for me to build 1000 miles? What if 
my colleague is actually my subordinate whose job depends on his 
maintaining favor with me? Clearly we need a much more robust 
definition of accountability for this term to do the work we expect of 
it. 
The conceptual task, therefore, is to build a workable definition of 
accountability that has sufficient leverage and clarity so as to 
 
(quoting Mark Moore of Harvard University and Margaret Gates, a consultant for 
nonprofit agencies, who state that “corruption, arbitrariness, and inefficiency . . . 
can be exorcized through mechanisms of accountability”); Mark Bovens, Public 
Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 182 (Ewan 
Ferlie et al. eds., 2007) (conveying that public accountability enhances the integrity 
of public governance providing safeguards against corruption and other forms of 
inappropriate behavior); Sanjeev Khagram et al., Overview and Synthesis: The 
Political Economy of Fiscal Transparency, Participation, and Accountability 
Around the World, in OPEN BUDGETS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL 
TRANSPARENCY, PARTICIPATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 3 (Sanjeev Khagram et 
al. eds., 2013) (maintaining that increased fiscal transparency and participation 
lead to improved accountability resulting in reduced corruption). 
 2.  See BEHN, supra note 1, at 4; Accountability Definition, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
accountability?show=0&t=1382219724 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
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irrefutably push towards good government and the rule of law.3 But 
where should our conceptual construction project begin and where 
should it end? The first element that most authors include is 
punishment or sanction. As Robert Behn has argued, “Those whom 
we want to hold accountable have a clear understanding of what 
accountability means: Accountability means punishment.”4 Andreas 
Schedler also incorporates this element into his definition of 
accountability, including both answerability, or “the obligation of 
public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing”5 
and enforcement, or “the capacity of accounting agencies to impose 
sanctions on powerholders who have violated their public duties.”6 
As we can see from this second definition, once we start building 
in new elements to the concept, it is very difficult to resist the 
temptation to push further. For instance, Schedler’s definition adds in 
the key concepts of “information,” “explanation,” and “accounting 
agencies.”7 Here the author encourages us to go beyond the relatively 
passive requirement of minimal exposure to include a more proactive 
 
 3.  See Steven Aftergood, An Inquiry into the Dynamics of Government 
Secrecy, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 511, 511 (2013) (referring to President 
Obama’s 2009 memorandum committing his administration to “creating an 
unprecedented level of openness in Government” as an essential quality of good 
government); Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and 
Their Alternatives in the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, n.4 
(2012) (commenting that the view that transparency is a subset of good 
government dates back to the Progressive Era, when a social and political 
movement led the charge for reforms to eradicate bureaucratic corruption, 
especially at the municipal level); see also Dr. Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law 
and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 58–
59 (2009) (explaining that “the rule of law plays different roles in different types, 
or phases, of domestic democratic development—from post-conflict state-building 
to the opening of private spheres in autocratic regimes, and from ensuring free and 
fair electoral transitions to the evolution of the institutional, regulatory, and 
normative elements necessary for minimalist, illiberal democracies to mature into 
effective, liberal ones”). 
 4.  BEHN, supra note 1, at 3. 
 5.  Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE SELF-
RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 14 
(Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999). 
 6.  See id. 
 7.  See id. at 15 (asserting that accountability involves the right to receive 
information and obligation to release all necessary details, and establishes a vocal 
relationship between accountable and accounting actors). 
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opening up on the part of public officials.8 It is not enough for 
bureaucrats to leave their ledgers open on their desks so that 
passersby can catch a glimpse of their reports. They must actively 
inform and explain what they are doing and perhaps even justify why 
in comprehensible language. In addition, Schedler’s reference to 
accounting agencies introduces the element of the participation of an 
external actor.9 For the author, it is not sufficient for the members of 
a government agency to be in full communication with each other; 
for accountability to exist there must also be a vigilant eye that gazes 
in from the outside.10 
Richard Mulgan’s definition of accountability emphasizes 
precisely this external nature of the accountability relationship. He 
argues that accountability includes three central elements: 1) “It is 
external, in that the account is given to some other person or body 
outside the person or body being held accountable”;11 2) “It involves 
social interaction and exchange, in that one side, that calling for the 
account, seeks answers and rectification while the other side, that 
being held accountable, responds and accepts sanctions”;12 3) “It 
implies rights of authority, in that those calling for an account are 
asserting rights of superior authority over those who are 
accountable.”13 This third element of Mulgan’s definition introduces 
a crucial new element to our discussion: “superior authority.”14 
According to Mulgan, accountability necessarily implies power.15 
Only when the observer stands above the observed can we speak of 
accountability. Indeed, following this line of thinking, other authors 
 
 8.  See id. (positing that key to the accountability of government and public 
officials is informing the public and explaining what they are doing). 
 9.  Id. at 14, 18, 21. 
 10.  Id. at 16 (referring to Taiwan and Nigeria’s need for independent 
authorities to prosecute and impose sanctions on offending officials that would 
otherwise escape investigation and prosecution because of their close relationship 
with the ruling party). 
 11.  Richard Mulgan, “Accountability”: An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 
PUB. ADMIN., no. 3, 2000, at 555. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id.  
 14.  “Superior authority” includes the right “to demand answers and to impose 
sanctions” from “those who are accountable.” Id. 
 15.  See id. at 563 (maintaining that institutions of accountability, such as 
legislatures, statutory authorities, and the courts, exist to control or constrain 
government power). 
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argue that accountability can only exist as an element of a “principal-
agent relationship.”16 Might it be that we can only speak of 
accountability when the actor being held accountable is directly at 
the service of the actor calling for the account? 
Although externality and superior authority are indeed often 
important elements of accountability relationships, they are by no 
means necessary for accountability to exist. “Internal” accountability 
relationships are widespread, for instance within a sports team, a 
government agency, or even a single individual.17 The coach of a 
team evaluates players’ performance and rewards or punishes them 
depending on the results, but so does each one of the players. 
External audit agencies often hold government agencies accountable 
for their actions, but so do fellow colleagues within a single ministry. 
In the extreme case, can’t an individual hold herself accountable for 
her own actions by, for instance, punishing herself if she fails to live 
up to her own standards of work performance? 
In addition, “horizontal” accountability relationships, between two 
actors of equal authority, are common in all areas of life and 
politics.18 Can’t one legislator hold another legislator accountable for 
whether or not she upholds the party platform during her floor votes? 
How about the relationship between an Ombudsman and an 
executive agency or between two twin brothers? We should not 
confuse sanctioning power with superior authority. The fact that I 
can punish you does not necessarily mean that I am above you. My 
punishment might be more effective if I am indeed in a superior 
 
 16.  See Erika Moreno et al., The Accountability Deficit in Latin America, in 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA 79, 83 (Scott Mainwaring & 
Christopher Welna eds., 2003) (contrasting the agency relationship, where the 
principal has discretionary authority over the agent, with accountability, where the 
authority runs from agent to principal). 
 17.  See BEHN, supra note 1, at 1 (indicating that within the government exist 
auditors, inspectors general, and independent counsel whose sole tasks are holding 
other government officials accountable); Mulgan, supra note 11, at 556 (referring 
to accountability as including an internal sense of responsibility and concern for 
the public interest by public servants); Bovens, Public Accountability, supra note 
1, at 184 (“[T]he actor, or accountor, can be either an individual or an agency.”). 
 18.  See Mark Bovens, Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a 
Virtue and as a Mechanism, 33 W. EUR. POL. 946, 956 (2010) (describing focus 
groups, citizen panels, and independent external assessment of the activities of 
public agencies as social forms of accountability that operate in a horizontal 
fashion). 
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position, but I can still observe, evaluate, and punish if we are 
equals.19 
Independently of how public servants are held accountable, what 
can they be held accountable for? Here there are two broad schools 
of thought. One wave equates accountability with honesty and rule 
following.20 Public servants should be evaluated, rewarded, and 
punished based on the extent to which they desist from corrupt and 
illegal practices.21 This is an essentially “negative” and process-based 
view of accountability insofar as it requires public servants only to 
refrain from certain activities. A second wave defends the idea that 
accountability also implies the affirmative task of effective 
performance and pro-active decision-making.22 This perspective 
points out that it is not very helpful for a public servant to follow the 
rules and not accept bribes if her actions and decisions do not lead to 
effective policy outcomes.23 
 
 19.  This last argument should not, of course, be interpreted as an attempt to 
weaken the strength or the relevance of those accountability relationships which 
are indeed grounded in power relationships. For instance, according to classic 
democratic theory, governments are accountable to the people because the citizens 
are the original power holders who delegate authority temporarily, and over certain 
specific issues, to the government. See Mulgan, supra note 11, at 555–56 (looking 
to how accountability mechanisms function in a democratic state). This 
understanding of the structure of democracy should ground all discussions of 
accountability. Nevertheless, when we limit our understanding exclusively to this 
framework we risk missing a great variety of other relationships that can be 
equally important for strengthening government accountability. 
 20.  See Melanie Manion, Excerpts from Corruption by Design: Building Clean 
Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong, in 4 PUBLIC SECTOR 
CORRUPTION 29, 30–31 (Michael Johnston ed., 2010) (discussing mechanisms of 
clean government as including clean officials who adhere to and enforce the rules 
associated with anti-corruption). 
 21.  Peter N. Grabosky, Citizen Co-Production and Corruption Control, in 4 
PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION 49, 53 (Michael Johnston ed., 2010) (explaining how 
some nations’ independent inspection organizations warn officials about 
violations, may impose reprimands, order an officer’s dismissal, and recover 
damages arising from official misfeasance). 
 22.  See Samuel Paul, Accountability in Public Services: Exit, Voice and 
Control, 20 WORLD DEV. 1047, 1055–56 (1992) (describing consulting 
participants in public hearings or advisory panels as one possible method for 
improved decision-making); see also BEHN, supra note 1, at 9–10 (stating that the 
goal of government is to “accomplish public purposes” and therefore, what it 
actually accomplishes is important in the accountability context). 
 23.  See BEHN, supra note 1, at 10 (conveying that what are important are the 
consequences of government action, such as change in policies, programs, and 
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The temporal dimension is another important aspect of 
accountability.24 Specifically, are there such things as “ex-ante” or 
“simultaneous” accountability, or is all accountability necessarily ex-
post? In the strictest sense, accountability can only be exercised after 
the fact. Since accountability involves the evaluation of the behavior 
of public servants, it is senseless to speak of evaluating something 
that does not already exist. Nevertheless, this truth should not lead us 
to conclude that public servants can only be held accountable for 
completed projects or “results.” For instance, an agent of 
accountability does not need to wait until the highway is already 
built to ask for information and explanations and evaluate the 
answers given. How was the strategic plan developed? How are the 
workers organized at the construction site? How do the engineers 
respond to unexpected circumstances? For the purpose of conceptual 
clarity, we can use the term “ex-post” accountability to refer to the 
evaluation of completed projects, the term “ex-ante” accountability 
to refer to the evaluation of plans of action and the term 
“simultaneous” accountability to refer to the evaluation of ongoing 
government initiatives. 
For those who might have doubts about the existence of ex-ante 
accountability mechanisms, the Administrative Procedure Act and 
National Environmental Policy Act in the United States are excellent 
examples.25 Before agencies can put new regulations into effect they 
are required to give complete information as to their content, justify 
them, and even defend them in court if questioned by civil society 
groups or individuals with legal standing.26 Such accountability 
mechanisms can be criticized for unnecessarily slowing down 
 
public services). 
 24.  Ernesto Isunza Vera, Para Analizar Los Procesos De Democratización: 
Interfaces Socioestatales, Proyectos Políticos y Rendición de Cuentas, in 
DEMOCRATIZACIÓN, RENDICIÓN DE CUENTAS Y SOCIEDAD CIVIL: PARTICIPACIÓN 
CIUDADANA Y CONTROL SOCIAL 265, 283–87 (Ernesto Isunza Vera & Alberto J. 
Olvera coords., 2006). 
 25.  See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966) (“A person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved 
by agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000) (requiring 
federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their activities before 
implementing proposals). 
 26.  See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966); National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000). 
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government action, as agencies spend significant time and resources 
justifying their plans and responding to criticisms, but this is a very 
different point from affirming that such forms are not accountability 
relationships at all.27 
An additional central element of the accountability equation is to 
understand that it is a process and not a state. To “be accountable” is 
to be in motion, not simply sitting in an office “open to criticism.” 
To “be accountable” is to work with society and accounting agencies 
to improve government honesty and performance instead of doing 
one’s best to hide from scrutiny.28 The pro-active behavior that 
accountability demands requires dialogue, explanation, and 
justification.29 
One other important distinction present in the literature is that 
between accountability and responsiveness.30 Some scholars argue 
that there is a radical split between these two concepts, that 
responding to the demands of citizens is very different from being 
accountable to them.31 For instance, Bernard Manin, Adam 
Przeworski, and Susan Stokes have claimed that “a government is 
‘responsive’ if it adopts policies that are signaled as preferred by 
citizens,”32 while “governments are ‘accountable’ if citizens can 
 
 27.  See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: 
THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 127 (1995) 
(“Although judicial review is criticized in the United States as time-consuming and 
ineffective . . . it has the advantage of explicitly requiring that political and policy 
decisions of agencies should be accountable to citizens.”).  
 28.  Id. at 126–27 (recommending other nations look to the United States’ 
method of requiring public notice, a rulemaking process that includes participation 
by public participants, and a judicial-review clause of the American Administrative 
Procedure Act in adopting regulations as a way to maintain legitimacy).  
 29.  This, of course, does not mean that different sorts of pro-activity are equal 
from a moral or a political point of view. For instance, it is quite different for a 
public servant to pro-actively inform and dialogue with her superior, an 
international agency, a large corporation, or a civil society group. Although each 
would consolidate her accountability to the respective actor, our evaluation of each 
type of accountability will depend on the importance that we place on the 
respective “agent of accountability.”  
 30.  Bernard Manin et al., Introduction to DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, 
AND REPRESENTATION 1, 8–10 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999). 
 31.  Id. (stating that “responsiveness” deals with the relationship between 
signals and policies while “accountability” deals with the relationship between 
outcomes and sanctions). 
 32.  Id. at 9.  
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discern representative from unrepresentative governments and can 
sanction them appropriately, retaining in office those incumbents 
who perform well and ousting from office those who do not.”33 The 
problem with such a radical distinction is that it conceptualizes 
government as an entity that citizens “alienate” or throw up into the 
air at each election and then try to discipline or control at the next.34 
From this perspective, accountability can only be exercised 
externally and ex-post. Citizens are only empowered to sanction the 
government after it has “performed” by changing their vote during 
periodic elections.35 
In contrast, I propose envisioning government as a part of the 
polity itself, not an external actor that the citizens lift up above them 
and then try to control after the fact. This alternative 
conceptualization of government envisions a constant give and take 
between state and society and the exercise of accountability both 
before and during the exercise of public authority.36 Here 
“responsiveness” and “accountability” are still two different 
concepts, the former referring to the motivation for an action or 
decision and the latter referring to the quality of the action or 
decision itself. Nevertheless, they are inextricably linked since a 
government that opens itself up fully to scrutiny and sanction before, 
during, and after it acts will usually also take very seriously the 
interests and demands of citizens.37 
The above discussion brings us to settle on a definition of 
accountability that includes pro-active behaviors like information 
and justification, the evaluation of performance in addition to rule-
following, the calling to account before, during, and after decisions 
 
 33.  Id. at 10. 
 34.  See Schedler, supra note 5, at 18 (observing that the idea of electoral 
accountability is characterized by punishing past behavior as voters do when 
holding politicians accountable at periodic elections). 
 35.  See Manin et al., supra note 30, at 10.  
 36.  John Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond “Exit” and 
“Voice”, 32 WORLD DEV. 447, 455 (2004) [hereinafter Ackerman, Co-Governance 
for Accountability] (referring to the success of past reforms as depending on the 
ability of the government to involve social actors from the beginning of the 
regulatory design phase). 
 37.  See id. at 451 (describing the success of Porto Alegre, Brazil’s 
accountability arrangement as encouraging active participation by any adult to 
attend, speak, advise, and vote in the assemblies).  
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are made, and, of course, the application of sanctions (both positive 
and negative).38 We can therefore define accountability as a pro-
active process by which public officials inform about and justify their 
plans of action, their behavior, and results, and are sanctioned 
accordingly.39 Figure 1 below summarizes the discussion of 
accountability up to this point: 
 

















But why worry about accountability as a specific target of 
intervention? Aren’t free and fair elections enough? Citizens elect 
representatives and then supposedly hold them accountable for their 
behavior at the following election. The representatives in turn 
appoint and hold bureaucrats and the members of the judicial branch 
accountable for their behavior. Such an “accountability chain” is 
supposed to assure good government and the rule of law since the 
 
 38.  See Paul, supra note 22, at 1054.  
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jobs of all public officials ultimately depend on the popular vote.40 
Unfortunately, research has shown that the accountability that 
public officials are exposed to through the celebration of periodic 
elections is just not enough to guarantee good government and the 
rule of law.41 There are three central problems with elections as 
accountability mechanisms. First, there is a profound problem of 
information asymmetry both between elected officials and the 
electorate and between bureaucrats and elected officials.42 It is 
simply impossible for citizens to be aware of each and every decision 
that an elected representative makes, or for an elected representative 
to be aware of every act performed by unelected public servants.43 
Add to this the media’s consistent manipulation of information and 
the ability for both elected and unelected officials to intentionally 
hide important facts, and the interference present in the 
accountability chain becomes formidable.44 Instead of a crystal clear 
fiber-optic line of communication between public officials and 
citizens, we have something more like a garbled telegram that can be 
deciphered in multiple ways. Under such circumstances the “moral 
hazard problem” raises its ugly head.45 Why would a bureaucrat 
 
 40.  Manin et al., supra note 30, at 10 (“Elections are a ‘contingent renewal’ 
accountability mechanism, where the sanctions are to extend or not to extend the 
government’s tenure.”). 
 41.  See id. at 12; Larry Diamond et al., Introduction to SELF-RESTRAINING 
STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES, 1, 12 (Andreas 
Schedler, et al. eds., 1999) (“[E]lections . . . are by themselves too weak to 
guarantee ‘decent’ government.”); see also STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, 
COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 7–8 
(2010) (pointing out the potential for fraud in the election process). 
 42.  Manin et al., supra note 30, at 12 (asserting that governments may act 
based on opinion polls, rather than on direct voter communication, to be more 
“responsive” than “representative”). 
 43.  See id. at 10–11 (stating that information may be too costly or impossible 
to obtain, making it difficult for the government to be both fully responsive and 
fully representative).  
 44.  See EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING 
CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA xii (1988) (discussing 
censorship and how it is used to shape the media). 
 45.  See Manin et al., supra note 30, at 12 (“[W]hen governments know what 
voters will be satisfied with and voters do not know what governments can do for 
them, room is opened for moral hazard.”); see also Shaila Dewan, Moral Hazard: 
A Temptest-Tossed Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, at BU1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/business/moral-hazard-as-the-flip-side-of-
self-reliance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (defining “moral hazard” as “the undue 
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follow the dictates of an elected official or an elected official the 
dictates of the citizens if it is much easier and more lucrative to take 
advantage of the communication breakdown and follow one’s own 
interests and agenda? 
The second problem with elections as accountability mechanisms 
is that they only operate ex-post. As discussed above, such 
monitoring and enforcement after the fact is indeed an important type 
of accountability.46 Nevertheless, it is only one part of the larger 
accountability landscape. Insofar as we conceptualize government as 
something that should be in constant contact with the public, we need 
to imagine and to construct ex-ante and simultaneous accountability 
mechanisms as well. If the public relies exclusively on ex-post 
accountability, it effectively “alienates” its voice by delegating its 
authority entirely during the periods between elections.47 This 
arrangement would not be a problem if the government were 
occupied by perfectly honest politicians and civil servants with 
whom we agree on all issues, but in the real world it is important to 
maintain a significant connection between citizens and government 
to prevent public officials from behaving as short-term dictators 
between elections.48 
Third, elections only allow citizens to exercise accountability 
externally, from “outside” of government. Elections are grounded in 
a clear split between state and society. Citizens send representatives 
to the capital through their vote, but do not participate themselves in 
the tasks of government. Representatives may consult the public 
before making decisions, and the public may change its vote in the 
next election, but it is excluded from playing a direct role in 
 
risks that people are apt to take if they don’t have to bear the consequences”).  
 46.  See Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55, 
60–61 (1994) (conveying that under a representative democracy, voters hold 
elected officials accountable vertically, and outside institutions hold them 
accountable horizontally, by “call[ing] into question, and eventually punish[ing], 
improper ways of discharging [their] responsibilities”). 
 47.  See id. at 65–66 (explaining that if elected officials are not answerable for 
their actions in between elections, it opens the door for elected officials to “[say] 
one thing during the campaign and [do] the contrary when in office”); see also 
Schedler, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that periodic elections allow voters to hold 
elected officials accountable, but in between elections, “incumbents may 
continually disclose their actions and justify them” without immediate recourse). 
 48.  See Schedler, supra note 5, at 19 (discussing the role that “agencies of 
accountability” play in reigning in power).  
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decision-making.49 Under formalistic representative democracy, 
excluding a more “participate version,” citizens normally do not have 
any concrete authority over government.50 
The above three problems are intimately connected in an 
interlocking negative feedback loop (see Figure 2 below). First, since 
citizens are external to government, it is much more difficult for 
them to have access to adequate information and to exercise 
accountability in anything other than an ex-post fashion.51 Second, 
citizens’ lack of information prevents them from effectively 
exercising ex-ante or simultaneous accountability or participating 
directly in the tasks of government.52 Third, the limitation to ex-post 
accountability makes citizens feel that they are unimportant for the 
functioning of government, thus minimizing the number and force of 
citizen demands for information and inclusion.53 
 









 49.  See O’Donnell, supra note 46, at 55, 60–61 (stating that voters become a 
passive audience of their representative following an election). 
 50.  See Manin et al., supra note 30, at 3 (“While citizens are free to discuss, 
criticize, and demand at all times, they are not able to give legally binding 
instructions to the government.”). 
 51.  See id. at 24 (describing the British government barring independent 
researchers from accessing tissue extracted from cows suffering from mad cow 
disease during the mad cow disease outbreak).  
 52.  See id. at 10–11 (“If people are not certain about . . . the effect of policies 
on outcomes, then they cannot be sure which policies are in their best interest or 
how much they can expect from the government.”). 
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III. CATEGORIES OF PRO-ACCOUNTABILITY 
REFORM 
The celebration of free and fair elections is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the establishment of good governance and the 
rule of law.54 Democracy needs to be complemented with reforms 
explicitly designed to improve government accountability.55 There 
are four general categories of pro-accountability reform: “Weberian 
reform,” “marketization,” “independent agencies,” and “social 
accountability.” This section outlines the nature of each one of these 
strategies in turn. Although each category summarizes a distinct way 
of approaching pro-accountability reform, the categories are by no 
means mutually exclusive. Indeed, in practice the best strategy is 
usually to combine various approaches to have the maximum 
impact.56 For instance, there is no contradiction in simultaneously 
strengthening bureaucracy along Weberian lines and opening up the 
doors of government to practices of social accountability. Indeed, 
when initiatives are well designed these two types of strategies can 
create synergies, which make the whole much more than a sum of 
the parts.57 
Max Weber understood bureaucracy to be the institutionalization 
of rationality in which each public servant had a specific task to carry 
out and was fully accountable for her actions to her superior.58 This 
understanding created a vertically integrated triangle with power 
 
 54.  See Diamond et al., supra note 41, at 2 (explaining that despite how 
competitive free and fair elections may be, they do not guarantee a decent 
government).  
 55.  See id. at 1 (suggesting that governments should exercise self-restraint and 
also be subject to external restraint and oversight to ameliorate government 
accountability). 
 56.  See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 448 
(describing the importance of combining answerability and enforcement processes 
to establish the accountability of public officials).  
 57.  See generally id. at 458 (arguing that “active involvement of civil society 
and the strengthening of the state apparatus are not mutually exclusive,” but that 
co-governance requires active participation by both the government and society).  
 58.  See James Pfiffner, Traditional Public Administration Versus the New 
Public Management: Accountability Versus Efficiency, in INSTITUTIONENBILDUNG 
IN REGIERUNG UND VERWALTUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS KONIG 443, 443 (A. 
Benz et al. eds., 2004) (discussing Weber’s emphasis on “monocratic hierarchy,” 
where “policy is set at the top” and the “role of the bureaucrat is strictly 
subordinate to the political supervisor”).  
  
308 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:2 
concentrated at the top in which “good governance” is guaranteed 
through careful supervision and the rational organization of the tasks 
of government.59 
This ideal type60 of bureaucracy dominated the field of public 
administration and public management for most of the twentieth 
century.61 Indeed, up to the present day, it is viewed as particularly 
important for scholars and practitioners in the developing world 
where the government apparatus is weak and the state is still not 
consolidated.62 A solid, rationally organized government is seen as 
the first line of attack against corruption, clientelism, and capture. 
Unfortunately, in the contemporary world of “flexible 
government” the strengthening of the command-and-control 
functions of government has fallen out of favor with many.63 
Nevertheless, such “old” public management strategies—like civil 
service reform and the improvement of internal auditing, evaluation, 
and surveillance—are absolutely central elements of any pro-
accountability reform package.64 If the central administrative 
apparatus does not have sufficient strength and legitimacy to control 
its own employees other pro-accountability reforms will surely fail.65 
 
 59.  See PAUL DU GAY, IN PRAISE OF BUREAUCRACY: WEBER, ORGANIZATION, 
ETHICS 44 (2000) (depicting bureaucracy as a “procedural, technical and 
hierarchical organization” where personal convictions must be set aside “to the 
diktats of procedural decision-making”). 
 60.  Weber’s “ideal typical” bureaucrat is an expression of the essential 
characteristics of social forms and does not necessarily reflect the reality of 
particular existing cases.  
 61.  See DONALD F. KETTL, THE GLOBAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION: 
A REPORT ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE 6, 67–68 (2000). 
 62.  Id. (“For political and administrative transformations to succeed, 
[developing nations] must frequently build new social structures, legal systems, 
and market arrangements.”).  
 63.  See LAWRENCE LYNN, JR., PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: OLD AND NEW 173 
(2006) (noting how Guy Peters’ state development models show that certain causes 
for bureaucratic dissatisfaction lead to different types of reform: centralized power 
reforms into a market system; hierarchy changes into a participatory government; 
inertia creates a flexible government; and over-regulation leads to regulation).  
 64.  See id. at 110–11 (describing the Clinton administration’s movement 
towards creating a smaller, cheaper, and more effective government by focusing on 
cutting red tape, putting the public first, and decentralizing decision-making power 
empowering employees to get results).  
 65.  See id. at 176–77 (explaining that even with a lack of resources, public 
administration should be capable of planning, management, organization, and basic 
functions). 
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One of the most popular recent waves of public administration 
reforms emphasizes both the privatization of public services and the 
imitation of private sector management techniques by government.66 
These two strategies are analytically and empirically distinct.67 It is 
one thing for the government to sell off government monopolies and 
it is quite another for the government to run itself like a business. 
Nevertheless, both strategies look to improve the accountability of 
service provision by introducing the discipline of the market and can 
go together under the name of “Marketization.”68 Privatization 
introduces the market in a single act while strategies such as 
managed competition, subcontracting, deregulation of government 
procedures, and flexiblization of government labor markets, 
introduce market behavior in a more piecemeal and indirect 
fashion.69 Such reforms involve society as an aggregation of 
consumers who can punish or reward service providers depending on 
their effectiveness. 
The functioning of the market here can sometimes serve as a 
powerful pro-accountability mechanism. However, it can also make 
accountability problems much worse by excluding public services 
from citizen oversight and transparency requirements.70 Furthermore, 
marketization should not be confused with social accountability, to 
be discussed below. Although both strategies look to tap into the 
energy of society to improve accountability, each reform strategy has 
 
 66.  See MICHAEL BARZELAY, THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: IMPROVING 
RESEARCH AND POLICY DIALOGUE 75 (2001) (providing England under Prime 
Minister Thatcher as an example of a nation that aimed to limit private sector 
management by divisionalizing government departments; for example agency 
chiefs acted like general managers who were accountable for their divisions’ 
performance, and ministers were like corporate CEOs who mainly did output 
control). 
 67.  See KETTL, supra note 61, at 1–2 (2000) (admitting, however, that both 
seek to change how managers run their programs by using influential market 
strategies). 
 68.  See id. 
 69.  See generally LYNN, supra note 63, at 178 (observing that managerialism 
often leads to long delegation chains that are counterproductive to accountability 
goals). 
 70.  See John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, Information 
Regulation: Controlling the Flow of Information to and from Administrative 
Agencies: the Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 85, 88 (2006) (describing the obligation citizens have to monitor the conduct 
of governmental organizations and to make sure public programs run properly). 
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a very different logic. While marketization seeks to send sections of 
the state off to society, social accountability seeks to invite society 
into the state. While marketization is grounded in the discourse of 
consumer protection and consumer choice, social accountability is 
based in the language of citizens’ rights and empowerment.71 
Social accountability also has a few important advantages over 
marketization since it retains central government control over service 
provision. First, social accountability retains the comparative 
advantage that the state has over the market in the provision of public 
goods, natural monopolies, basic necessities, and goods that require 
long-term planning and development. Second, since the state is still 
in control it keeps transaction costs to the minimum by permitting 
the focused coordination of multiple programs with parallel goals. 
When public services are broken down and sold off or sub-contracted 
out, this tends to significantly increase transaction costs. Using social 
accountability instead of marketization allows for the advantages of 
centralized coordination without the disadvantages of over-
bureaucratization. Third, it avoids the inequality-producing effects of 
market-based service delivery and caters to inclusion and social 
justice more directly. 
State reformers should remember that the New Public 
Management (“NPM”) can be applied in a wide variety of ways. As 
B. Guy Peters has pointed out, NPM is a catchall term that actually 
holds within it four different models of government: “market 
government,” “participative government,” “flexible government,” 
and “deregulated government.”72 Pro-accountability entrepreneurs 
should think twice before assuming that marketization is the best and 
only way to apply the NPM. Careful attention needs to be given to 
the type of good or service being provided, the increase in 
transaction costs marketization might provoke, the possible loss of 
strength in the accountability signal when “citizens” are replaced 
with “consumers,” and the potential for increases in inequality that 
can arise from marketization. In the end, the “participative” model of 
the NPM frequently can be even more effective than the “market,” 
 
 71.  See id. at 108 (explaining that accountability demands more than just 
giving citizens access to reports—accountability requires governmental 
organizations to justify their conduct in plain language). 
 72.  See B. GUY PETERS, THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING 21 (2001). 
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“flexible,” or “deregulation” models.73 
One of the most popular pro-accountability reforms in recent years 
has been the creation of Independent Pro-Accountability Agencies 
(“IPAs”).74 IPAs are autonomous public institutions that are 
responsible for holding government accountable in a specific issue 
area. Examples include autonomous corruption control bodies, 
independent electoral institutes, auditing agencies, human rights 
ombudsmen, and “public prosecutors.”75 In recent years, there has 
been a veritable explosion in the creation of such institutions in the 
developing world.76 In Latin America, Belize, Brazil, Columbia, 
Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, and Mexico have all created or revived one 
or more such independent institutions in the last decade.77 This trend 
is also present in Asia, Africa, Australia, and Eastern Europe.78 
Some countries have distinguished themselves as especially 
innovative cases in the creation of new pro-accountability 
institutions. Thailand’s 1997 constitution created seven different 
such institutions: the National Counter Corruption Commission, an 
independent electoral commission, an ombudsman, a constitutional 
court, an administrative court, an environmental review board 
responsible for evaluating the environmental impact of public 
projects, and a consumer review board which involves consumer 
 
 73.  See id. at 50 (noting that pursuant to the participative model of reform, the 
government should be responsible for finding out what the public wants and how 
to deliver results). 
 74.  See Carmen Alpín-Lardiés & Mario Classen, Conclusion to SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN AFRICA: PRACTITIONERS’ EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS 212 
(Carmen Alpín-Lardiés & Mario Classen eds., 2010) (acknowledging that two 
other popular accountability reforms are social accountability and public sector 
reform). 
 75.  See JONATHAN FOX, ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICS: POWER AND VOICE IN 
RURAL MEXICO 35 (2007) (explaining that these new institutions of horizontal 
accountability complement the legislatures, judiciaries, and sub-national 
governments already in existence). 
 76.  John Ackerman, Understanding Independent Accountability Agencies, in 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 265 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. 
Lindseth eds., 2010). 
 77.  See id. at 265 n.3 (noting that there has been an increase in constitution 
courts and regulatory agencies, and providing Mexico as an example to 
demonstrate how the development of IPAs has been an effective in improving 
bureaucratic performance). 
 78.  See id. 
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representatives in the design of consumer protection laws.79 Hungary 
is another fascinating case insofar as it has recently established four 
different ombudsmen, one for human rights protection, a second for 
national and ethnic minorities, a third for data protection and 
freedom of information, and a fourth for education.80 In Latin 
America, the new constitutions of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia 
radically redefine the division of powers.81 Other examples include 
the Chilean Contralor,82 the Peruvian Ombudsman,83 the Brazilian 
Ministerio Público,84 and the flurry of new agencies recently created 
by the Mexican government.85 
The performance of IPAs varies widely between countries. In 
many countries there is a long tradition of creating new 
“independent” bureaucracies in response to problems to make the 
government appear as if it were committed to resolving the issue at 
hand, whether it be corruption, human rights violations, free and fair 
 
 79.  See Danny Unger, Principals of the Thai State, in REINVENTING 
LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 181, 196–97 (Ben Ross Schneider & Blanca Heredia eds., 2003) 
(describing the path-breaking changes in the Thai Constitution that now require 
government agencies to provide information, explanations, and rationales for 
policies affecting citizens’ individual rights). 
 80.  SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, FROM ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY: BUILDING 
ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY AND POLAND 80 (2005). 
 81.  See John Ackerman, Estado Democrático, Rendición de Cuentas y 
Organismos Autónomos en América Latina, in AMÉRICA LATINA: DEMOCRACIA, 
ECONOMÍA Y DESARROLLO SOCIAL 91, 97–99 (Gregorio Vidal & Omar de León 
eds., 2010). 
 82.  See Peter M. Siavelis, Disconnected Fire Alarms and Ineffective Police 
Patrols: Legislative Oversight in Postauthoritarian Chile, 42 J. INTERAM. STUD. & 
WLD. AFF. 71, 72 (2000) (noting that before the military regime took over in 1973, 
Chilean IPAs were considered above party politics). 
 83.  Charles D. Kenney, Reflections on Horizontal Accountability: Democratic 
Legitimacy, Majority Parties and Democratic Stability in Latin America, at n.13, 
Draft prepared for the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of 
Notre Dame Conference on Institutions, Accountability, and Democratic 
Governance in Latin America (May 8–9, 2000), available at 
http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty/research/pdfs/Kenney.pdf (commenting that the 
Peruvian Ombudsman’s Office has come to enjoy a degree of legitimacy due, in 
part, to the leadership of Jorge Santistevan de Noriega).  
 84.  See generally ROGÉRIO BASTOS ARANTES, MINISTERIO PÚBLICO E 
POLÍTICA NO BRASIL (2002). 
 85.  See Ackerman, Understanding Independent Accountability Agencies, 
supra note 76, at 267 n.3.  
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elections, etc.86 Such institutional innovations often successfully 
deflect criticism from the central bureaucracy, thereby permitting the 
government to avoid a full reform of the state.87 The transparency 
and openness to participation also varies widely between IPAs. For 
instance, while ombudsmen tend to be open and to provide much 
needed information to the public, auditing agencies tend to be much 
more closed-lipped.88 
My own research shows that there is a direct relationship between 
the effectiveness of IPAs and the level and intensity of their 
interaction with society.89 Those IPAs that take their role as bridges 
seriously are the ones that fulfill their mandates more effectively, 
while those that separate themselves from either the government or 
society tend to end in isolation and ineffectiveness.90 Here, we see 
that so called “horizontal” and “vertical” accountability cannot be so 
easily separated. The strength of government accounting agencies 
depends on their connection with society at large, which leads us to 
the question of social accountability. 
Governments can do a great deal on their own to improve 
accountability through actions such as strengthening top-down 
oversight, professionalizing staff through civil service reform, 
empowering internal comptrollers, establishing performance 
contracts, and creating new independent public oversight agencies.91 
Nevertheless, pro-accountability reform is much more effective when 
 
 86.  See Michael Dodson & Donald W. Jackson, Horizontal Accountability and 
the Rule of Law in Central America, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN 
AMERICA 228, 229 (Scott Mainwaring & Christopher Welna eds., 2003) 
(explaining that a “political democracy” upholds the citizens’ guaranteed rights, 
and makes sure no one is above the law, including the elected officials). 
 87.  See id. 
 88.  See Frederick Uggla, The Ombudsman in Latin America, 36 J. LAT. AM. 
STUD. 423, 424–25 (2004) (distinguishing ombudsmen from prosecutors and 
accounting offices because ombudsmen can create resolutions from citizens’ 
complaints relatively cheaply). 
 89.  See John Ackerman, Organismos Autónomos y la Nueva División de 
Poderes en México y América Latina, INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES JURÍDICAS 
DE LA UNAM 12, 16–21, available at http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/6/2834/ 
5.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Ackerman, Organismos Autónomos]. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  But see Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 
447 (noting that both old public management strategies, such as civil service 
reform, and new public management strategies, such as managed competition and 
performance contracts, isolate the public from state activities). 
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societal actors play a central role as well.92 There are a great variety 
of initiatives that fall under this category. Initiatives as different as 
participatory budgeting, administrative procedures acts, and social 
audits, all involve citizens in the oversight and control of government 
and therefore can be considered social accountability initiatives.93 
Here we give a brief overview of this category of pro-accountability 
reform. 
The universe of government action is so broad that it is virtually 
impossible to oversee the entirety of the operation.94 Comptrollers 
can only perform a limited number of audits. Human rights 
ombudsmen can only respond to a certain number of complaints. 
Legislatures can only follow up on a specific number of government 
programs. Budgets can be expanded and powers can be extended, but 
the infinite detail of government behavior will always escape the 
view of the overseer. There is no single all-seeing “god’s eye” point 
of view from which to control the government apparatus. 
It is therefore necessary to complement such top-down “police 
patrol” oversight strategies with bottom-up “fire alarm” 
mechanisms.95 For Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 
“police patrol” oversight is the traditional modality in which 
supervisory agencies operate, trying to keep a constant eye on those 
they are supposed to monitor.96 To the contrary, “fire alarm” 
 
 92.  See CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS 
AND THE CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 216–17 (2009) (noting activist 
movements of the 1960s which put pressure on bureaucracies to make certain 
administrative processes open to public accountability, such as police disciplinary 
procedures). 
 93.  See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 450–
51, 457 (commenting that administrative procedure acts and referendum laws help 
make the government and its elected officials accountable to the public that voted 
for them, and that participatory budgeting is also an important accountability 
concept because it allows citizens to help plan where the government should spend 
public funds; in doing so it reduces the incentives for corruption and the political 
use of public funds). 
 94.  See id. at 449 (specifying that the major difficulty is in monitoring the 
exorbitant amount of governmental communications, actions, and inactions). 
 95.  See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 
(1984).  
 96.  See id. at 165–66 (explaining that police patrol oversight is more 
centralized than fire alarm oversight, and it involves Congress studying a sample 
of agency activities to detect violations and provide remedies). 
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oversight occurs when an agency relies on external actors to detect 
when there are problems (to sound the alarm) and then focuses its 
attention particularly carefully on those areas that require extra 
attention.97 While a roving police car might happen to come upon a 
burglar or a burning building, society is everywhere. Indeed, 
according to Catalina Smulovitz, this gives society an extra plus.98 
Since society is everywhere, it does not even have to act in all cases 
to make its presence felt. The mere threat that society might sound 
the alarm or respond in other more disruptive ways is often enough 
to control public servants.99 
Unfortunately, although society is omnipresent it is often quite 
dormant. Indeed, the capacity of onlookers to not intervene to resolve 
problems is well known, particularly in highly modernized, urban 
areas.100 Numerous examples exist of circles of curious passersby 
who do little or nothing to help victims of accidents, heart attacks, or 
theft. In addition, civil society is not always as “pure” as it is often 
made out to be.101 Any power that is given to society risks being co-
opted by criminal organizations and powerful interest groups, who 
only look for personal and group benefits.102 
Society is a powerful potential force for strengthening government 
accountability. Nevertheless, this force does not come alive 
automatically or always in the most productive forms.103 Pro-
 
 97.  See id. 
 98.  See Catalina Smulovitz, How Can the Rule of Law Rule? Cost Imposition 
Through Decentralized Mechanisms, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 168, 
171 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003) (arguing that having 
many “decentralized external eyes” increases the amount of people interested in 
enforcing the rule of law). 
 99.  See id. at 172 (explaining that “decentralization allows for a ‘fire alarm’ 
type of control,” providing a piecemeal approach to control transgressions to the 
rule of law). 
 100.  See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 95, at 168 (implying that lack of 
violation reporting in a fire alarm system may lead to less oversight because 
congressmen would not be motivated by their constituents). 
 101.  See generally Smulovitz, supra note 98, at 168–69 (indicating that citizens 
will only follow the laws if the penalties for breaking them are costly). 
 102.  See id. at 169 (explaining that when the government does not follow the 
rule of law, it can gain support from the criminal organizations or interest groups 
that benefit from the its illegal conduct). 
 103.  See id. at 169–70 (suggesting that when some citizens find it beneficial to 
not hold their government accountable, the rule of law cannot become self-
enforcing; the key to sustaining a self-enforcing rule of law is a “consensus of 
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accountability reformers need to design mechanisms that both help 
translate this potentiality into action and privilege social actors that 
work for the public interest. Context is absolutely crucial. There is no 
single “silver bullet” or special recipe for creating successful social 
accountability initiatives. As this article will show below, the best 
strategy will always depend on the social and political context. 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
What has come to be called the “human rights based approach” to 
development offers a good starting point for undergirding a solid 
commitment to social accountability in anti-corruption policy.104 The 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCR”) 
understands this as an approach that “links poverty reduction to 
questions of obligation, rather than welfare or charity.”105 The British 
Department for International Development (“DFID”) defines this 
approach as “empowering people to take their own decisions, rather 
than being the passive objects of choices made on their behalf.”106 
The World Bank has also claimed that “social accountability is a 
right” and that such initiatives are grounded in “a new manifestation 
of citizenship based on the right to hold governments accountable by 
expanding people’s responsibility.”107 
 
values” that allow citizens to act together). 
 104.  See Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to 
Development Cooperation, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RIGHTS 
9–10 (2006), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf 
[hereinafter OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions] (explaining that human rights 
can provide standards against which the public can hold the government 
accountable and arguing that human rights promotes the rule of law and 
encourages public participation in governance).  
 105.  See Human Rights and Poverty Reduction: A Conceptual Framework, 
OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RIGHTS iii (2003), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PovertyReductionen.pdf 
(discussing that the foundation for a human rights based approach to poverty 
reduction is in international law and government accountability is critical to 
supporting human rights). 
 106.  See Realising Human Rights for Poor People, DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV. 7 
(2000), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/docs/human_rights_tsp 
.pdf (explaining that the organization’s goal is to have poor people’s ideas and 
perspectives directly influence the laws and policy created for their betterment). 
 107.  See From Shouting to Counting: A New Frontier in Social Development, 
THE WORLD BANK SOC. DEV. DEP’T. 2 (last visited Nov. 1, 2013), 
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The core objective of the human rights approach to development is 
to invert the power relationships between service providers and the 
poor.108 Instead of envisioning development as a process by which 
governments, foundations, or international agencies channel 
resources to help excluded groups overcome poverty and suffering, 
the human rights approach starts by acknowledging the entitlements 
of the poor.109 As a result, according to this perspective, “service 
providers” are better conceptualized as “duty-bearers.”110 It is their 
obligation, not their choice, to guarantee the human rights of the 
poor, the “rights-holders.”111 
This approach gives a very different taste to development. As 
Andrea Cornwall has argued, instead of talking about “beneficiaries 
with needs” or “consumers with choices” the human rights approach 
speaks of “citizens with rights.”112 Citizens are active subjects in the 
political sphere, not objects of intervention by government programs 
or passive choosers in the marketplace. 
Citizenship necessarily implies empowerment and the active 
participation of the poor in the design, control, oversight, and 




 108.  See Philip C. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human 
Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417, 442 (2006) (describing various NGOs’, such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, commitment to promoting social 
and economic justice on a global scale). 
 109.  See William R. O’Neill, S.J., Commonweal or Woe? The Ethics of Welfare 
Reform, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 487, 489 (1997) (listing basic 
entitlements including welfare rights to nutritional well-being, health care, or 
employment opportunities).  
 110.  See Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New 
Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of 
Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 92 (2010) (arguing that there is an 
international duty of states to ensure that their regulatory systems are designed to 
recognize human rights across social sectors). 
 111.  See id.; O’Neill, supra note 109, at 489. 
 112.  See ANDREA CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN: 
PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION FOR POVERTY REDUCTION 66 (Anne Sisak ed., 
2002) [hereinafter CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN] (arguing that 
citizenship should include participation in government with rights granted by the 
State, instead of just as a national identity); Andrea Cornwall, Preface for THE 
PARTICIPATION READER xii, xii–xiii (Andrea Cornwall ed., 2000) (explaining that 
the human rights approach seeks to expand participation beyond invited 
participation to mobilization, insurgency, and struggles for rights and citizenship). 
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according to authors such as Clare Ferguson and Julia Håusermann 
the right to participation should be seen as the foundational base of 
the rights approach since it is the prerequisite to claiming all of the 
rest of the human rights.113 The very act of demanding the fulfillment 
of one’s rights requires an active subject, who is in control of his or 
her life, a participant in his or her own process of development.114 
Nevertheless, not just any sort of participation will do the trick. It 
is not sufficient for a government only to open up controlled spaces 
for opinion-giving or popular consultation for it to claim that it is 
applying a human rights approach.115 The value-added of the human 
rights approach is that “it offers the possibility of shifting the frame 
of participatory interventions away from inviting participation in pre-
determined spaces to enabling people to define for themselves their 
own entry points and strategies for change.”116 A human rights 
approach to participation begins with empowerment and then 
searches for strategic inroads into the government or other duty 
holders.117 It does not try to circumscribe who can participate when 
and how depending on the spaces already open within the 
government. It is therefore a truly “bottom-up” approach to 
development. 
In addition to inverting power relationships and requiring 
participation, the human rights approach also teaches impatience and 
intolerance to poverty and injustice.118 The violation of so-called 
 
 113.  See CLARE FERGUSON, GLOBAL SOCIAL POLICY PRINCIPLES: HUMAN 
RIGHTS & SOCIAL JUSTICE 3, 15 (1999) (stating that democratic participation in 
government allows individuals to enforce their own rights and bring claims if they 
are violated); JULIA HÅUSERMANN, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO 
DEVELOPMENT 180–81 (1998) (noting that this type of participation is necessary 
for sustainable development).  
 114.  See HÅUSERMANN, supra note 113, at 180 (specifying that poor people 
need to be involved in the prioritizing of issues, the implementing of solutions, and 
the evaluation of the solutions’ effectiveness). 
 115.  See Andrea Cornwall, Locating Citizen Participation, 33 INST. OF DEV. 
STUDIES 49, 49 (asserting that people marginalized by the government and society 
are also associated with “popular participation”). 
 116.  CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN, supra note 112, at 68. 
 117.  See id. at 68, 75 (explaining that predetermined inroads are not nearly as 
valuable as enabling citizens to create their own ways to participate in 
development). 
 118.  See SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 20 (Sherith Pankratz 
ed., 2010) (explaining that under the synthetic approach, the “framing perspective” 
calls for social movement leaders and organizations to identify injustices to inspire 
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“civil” and “political” rights usually causes immediate indignation 
and protest.119 Incidents like the torture of opposition political 
leaders, the censorship of the media, and the violent repression of 
street protests often lead to immediate and powerful reactions by the 
affected actors and other interested parties. Unfortunately, the 
existence of poverty, unemployment, and sickness do not always 
create the same kind of urgent response. 
Here, the human rights approach to development looks to remind 
us of the fundamental indivisibility of human rights. As the U.N. 
states, “[H]uman rights are indivisible . . . [w]hether of a civil, 
cultural, economic, political or social nature, they are all inherent to 
the dignity of every human person . . . . Consequently, they all have 
equal status as rights, and cannot be ranked, a priori, in hierarchical 
order.”120 So called “economic” and “social” rights like the right to 
work, social security, education, and health are just as fundamental 
as “civil” and “political” rights like the right to protection against 
torture, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech.121 From a 
human rights perspective, the absence of medicine or doctors at a 




 119.  See CHARLES TILLY & SIDNEY TARROW, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 2, 12–13 
(2007) (referring to various historical accounts of protests in reaction to violations 
of civil and political rights, such as those following the alleged 2004 “stolen 
election” in Ukraine, and more historically, the reaction of the Boston colonists in 
the late 1700s which culminated to the dumping of tea into the Boston Harbor); see 
also, STAGGENBORG, supra note 118, at 20 (discussing how the synthetic resource 
mobilization model views individual discontent as the impetus behind collective 
action, as well as an instigator of social change). 
 120.  The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation: 
Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS 
BASED APPROACHES PORTAL, available at http://hrbaportal.org/the-human-rights-
based-approach-to-development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding-
among-un-agencies (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 121.  See generally id.; Katherine E. Cox, Should Amnesty International Expand 
Its Mandate to Cover Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 261, 262 (1999) (asserting that particularly in developing countries, 
abuses of civil and political rights cannot be effectively tackled without 
simultaneously addressing longstanding economic and social problems).  
 122.  See CAROL BELLAMY, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2004: 
GIRLS, EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT 92 (2003) (stating that the right to health is 
governed by human rights principles). Compare The Right to Health, OFFICE OF 
THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RTS. 27 (2008), 
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What this means is that the violation of economic and social rights 
requires immediate and forceful responses.123 If a government 
neglects to provide teachers to a local school, the community is 
within its right to protest and organize. If an international agency 
fails to attend to the negative social consequences of the economic 
policies it recommends, the population is entirely justified to call for 
the immediate resolution of its grievances. 
Finally, the human rights approach is grounded in the idea that the 
source of poverty lies in the structure of the power relations that exist 
in society.124 In addition to “empowering” the poor, this approach 
looks to transform the framework of power in society as a whole.125 
In other words, human rights requires “scaling up.” This is most 
obvious in the area of political rights. In addition to freedom of 
speech and freedom of association, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights also claims that citizens have the right to participate 
in government itself through the celebration of democratic 
elections.126 It is not enough to “be empowered.” The structure of 
political decision-making itself must put citizens in a position of 
power. 
The same applies for economic and social rights. It is not enough 
for citizens to participate in planning local development projects or 
speak out against poor service delivery to fulfill the human rights 
 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf (emphasizing that 
states are obligated to adopt national health policies and provide adequate 
healthcare), with Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 
(Dec. 10, 1984), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm 
(declaring that States Parties to the Convention Against Torture must take 
appropriate measures to prevent torture). 
 123.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf (asserting that States Parties that do not 
comply to certain obligations under the ICESCR are expected to create a plan of 
implementation within two years of ratifying).  
 124.  See OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 104, at 9. 
 125.  See CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN, supra note 112, at 78 
(arguing that simply encouraging impoverished individuals to participate in public 
engagement is not enough, but rather, they should be enabled “to exercise agency 
through the institutions, spaces and strategies they make and shape for 
themselves”).  
 126.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1984).  
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approach. Citizens should be made direct participants in the wealth 
of the national economy as well as in national economic policy-
making.127 As this U.N. document on a “Common Understanding” of 
the human rights based approach states, programs that comply with 
this approach must include “assessment and analysis to identify . . . 
the immediate, underlying, and structural causes of the non-
realization of rights.”128 As Cornwall has pointed out, this element of 
the human rights approach is so important, because, 
[I]n emphasizing obligation and responsibility, the rights-based approach 
opens up the possibilities of a renewed focus on the root causes of poverty 
and exclusion, and on the relations of power that sustain equity . . . . 
Bringing governance squarely into the frame, exclusion becomes in itself 
a denial of rights and the basis for active citizens to make demands, 
backed by legal instruments.129 
The following table summarizes the above-mentioned five central 
elements of the human rights approach to development: 
 
Table 1: The Human Rights Approach to Development 







Participation Top-down Bottom-up 
Economic & 
Social Rights 
Less Urgent than Civil 
& Political Rights 




Unimportant or Ignored 
Central to Overcoming 
Poverty 
 
Social accountability initiatives may or may not fall within the 
category of human rights approaches to development.130 The fact that 
 
 127.  See, e.g., BELLAMY, supra note 122, at 93 (advocating that people are 
important actors and are “key” in their own development). 
 128.  Id. at 93.  
 129.  See CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN, supra note 112, at 67. 
 130.  See Melish, supra note 110, at 71–72 (2010) (explaining that there has 
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they have to do with accountability and improving governance does 
not guarantee that they also have to do with human rights. A more 
accountable government is not necessarily one that approaches the 
task of development from a human rights perspective. It is easy to 
imagine a government that informed its citizens about and justified 
every one of its actions in a pro-active manner and exposed its public 
servants to clear sanctions depending on their performance, but still 
approached the poor in a paternalistic, charity-based manner. 
The involvement of civil society in pro-accountability initiatives 
does not necessarily guarantee their human rights component either. 
As discussed above, “participation” can take many different forms. 
“Beneficiaries” can participate by replacing government officials in 
the delivery of goods and services.131 “Consumers” can participate in 
service delivery by sending market signals about their preferences.132 
The people at large can “participate” by making their opinions 
known or responding to specific invitations made by the 
government.133 None of these modalities truly fulfills the promise of 
the human rights perspective. This perspective requires a bottom-up 
approach to participation in which empowerment comes before 
opportunity and rights come before efficiency. 
Only when social accountability initiatives are grounded in a 
vision of service providers as duty-bearers, that sees the poor as 
citizens, stimulates participation from the bottom-up, emphasizes the 
indivisibility of human rights, and is oriented towards changing the 
overall power structure can we speak of a human rights approach in 
action.134 But how can we judge whether this is the case or not? What 
 
been a shift in the human rights approach, and that whereas the “old” human rights 
approach was focused on the protection the political rights of individuals from 
state apparatuses—and thus far more state-centric—the new approach gives more 
power to local administrative units and private actors). 
 131.  See CORNWALL, BENEFICIARY, CONSUMER, CITIZEN, supra note 112, at 
11, 17 (commenting that beginning in the 1970s with the passage of legislation, 
“beneficiaries” played more active roles in development). 
 132.  See id. at 32 (relaying that market participation will affect economic 
activity). 
 133.  See id. at 13 (arguing that poverty and disempowerment cannot be 
combated by simply inviting participation in “projects, programmes or processes” 
and instead, people must be enabled to create their own spaces for engagement). 
 134.  See generally id. at 60–61 (providing a historical overview of the shift in 
development discourse regarding participation towards more of a merging of 
participation and good governance, in which government service delivery is more 
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are the specific indicators of the presence of a human rights approach 
in social accountability initiatives? 
For each element of the human rights approach we can design 
specific indicators, which will reveal whether the element exists. 
First, with regard to the charity (or obligation) criteria, an excellent 
indicator is whether formal legal instruments are encouraged as a 
means by which citizens can claim their rights.135 The encouragement 
of legal recourse demonstrates that service providers are being 
conceptualized as duty-bearers, since it is the law that ultimately 
grounds the duty to uphold human rights.136 If legal recourse is not 
encouraged, this puts in doubt the idea that the service provider is 
obligated to perform effectively. 
Second, with regard to the beneficiaries/consumer/citizen criteria, 
we can examine to what extent the participants in the social 
accountability initiatives are encouraged to engage in a broad debate 
about the underlying sources of the problems which they encounter 
daily in their interaction with the government.137 Are citizens only 
expected to give their opinions and participate in the solutions 
concerning the delivery of specific services, or are they taken 
seriously as political actors who can participate in constructing and 
implementing broader national or international solutions? 
Third, with regard to the “direction” of participation, are the 
participatory mechanisms designed externally and then “imposed” on 
the population, or are previously existing community forms of 
participation taken as the starting point for the design of the 
mechanisms? Is participation carefully controlled and limited to 
previously existing spaces or is it encouraged to multiply and expand 
beyond these spaces? 
 
responsive to the needs of the poor and attempts to enable the poor to have a say in 
the policies that concern their lives). 
 135.  See WALTER EBERLEI, INSTITUTIONALISED PARTICIPATION IN PROCESSES 
BEYOND THE PRSP 26 (2001), available at http://inef.uni-
due.de/page/documents/Eberlei_(2001)_-_GTZ_-_Institutionalisation_(engl).pdf 
(citing to other authorities to argue that political participation should be “protected 
by the rule of law” and that the poor should feel safe to take steps towards 
improving their situation through legal means) (internal citations omitted). 
 136.  See, e.g., id. (contending that a functioning judiciary is required to 
diminish poverty). 
 137.  E.g., id. at 41 (relating that countries with well-developed participation 
include “open and continuous” public debates to address poverty reduction). 
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Fourth, are violations of economic, social, and cultural rights 
placed at the same level as the violations of political and civil rights? 
Specifically, are patience and tolerance to violations of so-called 
second generation rights preached, or is the initiative inspired by a 
push for immediate action? 
Fifth, with regard to the issue of the overarching power structure, a 
crucial indicator is whether the actors and forces, which oppose 
improving government accountability, are explicitly named and 
engaged with or simply not mentioned.138 Insofar as these opposing 
forces are not explicitly taken into account, this is an indicator of a 
tendency to sweep larger structural problems under the rug.139 
The following table (Table 2) summarizes the indicators for each 
one of the elements of the human rights approach: 
 
Table 2: Indicators of the Human Rights Approach in Social 
Accountability Initiatives 
Core Element Indicator 
Service Providers as Duty-
Holders 
Is formal legal recourse encouraged? 
Participants as Citizens Are citizens encouraged to think beyond 
immediate and localistic concerns? 
Bottom-up Participation Is participation expansive and does it build 
on previously existing practices? 
Indivisibility of Human 
Rights 
Is the initiative inspired by a push for 
immediate and urgent action? 
Power Structure Are opposing forces explicitly named and 
engaged with? 
 
In general, an important challenge with regard to implementing a 
human rights approach is the institutionalization of social 
 
 138.  Cf. DENA RINGOLD ET AL., CITIZENS AND SERVICE DELIVERY 33 (2011) 
(emphasizing generally the importance of the citizens’ right to information 
regarding service delivery, including information whether policy makers and 
providers are doing their jobs properly). 
 139.  But see id. at 33–34 (suggesting that it is still uncertain whether having 
access to an information framework actually improves the quality of public 
services). 
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accountability initiatives. As Walter Eberlei has written, a certain 
“event culture” tends to prevail when the concepts of societal 
participation and civic engagement are brought to the table.140 Many 
public officials seem to believe that all that these concepts imply is 
the holding of a series of hearings, workshops, and consultations, not 
the establishment of a long-term participatory dialogue with civil 
society.141 
There are three different levels at which participatory mechanisms 
can be institutionalized in the state. First, participatory mechanisms 
can be built into the strategic plans of government agencies, with 
rules and procedures mandated that require “street-level bureaucrats” 
to consult or otherwise engage with societal actors.142 Second, 
specific government agencies can be created that have the goal of 
assuring societal participation in government activities or act as a 
liaison in charge of building links with societal actors.143 Third, 
participatory mechanisms can be inscribed in law, requiring 
individual agencies or the government as a whole to involve societal 
actors at specific moments of the public policy process.144 
Although the first level of institutionalization is more or less 
widespread and the second level is relatively common, the third level 
is extremely rare. There are of course some important exceptions, 
including the Administrative Procedures Act in the United States, 
Bolivia’s Popular Participation Law, Porto Alegre’s Participatory 
Budgeting framework, Mexico City’s Citizen Participation Law, and 
 
 140.  EBERLEI, supra note 135, at 9. 
 141.  See id. at 14–15 (claiming that although in theory poverty reduction 
strategies should build on existing political processes to ensure long-term 
implementation, in practice, oftentimes these poverty reduction activities are not 
structurally integrated and are thus limited and weak).  
 142.  See id. at 15, 16 (advocating for representative participation in which civil 
society and private sector actors are involved in processes according to the broad 
section of the population they are capable of representing). 
 143.  See Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin, & Evan Mendelson, 
Transparency in Public Participation in the Rulemaking Process, U. OF PA. L. 
SCH. 18–19 (2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/ 
transparencyReport.pdf (expressing that agencies can relay informal 
communications with external actors to administrators to actuate effective 
rulemaking). 
 144.  See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 459 
(emphasizing that participatory mechanisms are most effective when fully 
institutionalized, meaning that public involvement is within a clear legal structure). 
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the wave of freedom of information laws that has swept the world 
over the past two decades.145 Nevertheless, these exceptions only 
prove the rule that participatory mechanisms are usually vastly 
under-institutionalized, depending too much on the ingenuity and 
good will of individual bureaucrats. 
Why this is the case is more or less evident. Law making under 
democratic conditions involves the messy process of legislative 
bargaining and a full role for political parties.146 State reformers and 
multilateral agencies tend to shy away from such arenas, especially 
when they are dominated by opposing parties or factions.147 
Therefore, reformers usually settle for executive procedures, special 
agencies, or innovative individual bureaucrats to carry out their 
participative strategies. 
This is a mistake. If dealt with in a creative fashion, partisanship 
can be just as effective as isolation in the search for effective 
accountability mechanisms.148 It is absolutely crucial to involve 
political parties and the legislature to fully institutionalize 
participative mechanisms through the law. 
In addition to the institutionalization of social accountability 
mechanisms in the state, we can also speak of their 
institutionalization in society. Good laws, open institutions, and pro-
active public servants will do very little if civil society itself is not 
able to take advantage of these openings. On the one hand, civil 
society organizations and groups need to build their capacity to 
dialogue with government and hold it to account.149 This endeavor 
involves including the education and training of civil society as a 
central element of any social accountability initiative.150 On the other 
hand, civil society groups ought to band together to assure the long-
 
 145.  See generally id. at 451 (explaining how these governments are addressing 
participatory mechanisms). 
 146.  Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 459. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See EBERLEI, supra note 135, at 3 (stating that the participation in political 
processes of civil society actors “remains an absolutely essential element” for the 
development of poverty-reduction policies). 
 150.  See RINGOLD ET AL., supra note 138, at 41 (affirming that governments 
and civil society organizations are using information campaigns to provide citizens 
with information regarding their rights and the standards of services they should 
expect, in an effort to increase the access and use of these services). 
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term continuity and “institutionalization” of social accountability 
initiatives.151 With many groups participating in coordinated fashion, 
the permanence of the effort is much more likely guaranteed. 
Nevertheless, there is such a thing as “over-institutionalization.”152 
Once participation is legally recognized and socially organized, it is 
also controlled by those forces. Institutionalization can work as a 
double-edged sword. In general, the risk is the creation of an elite 
class of individuals or civil society organizations who supposedly 
speak for the people but do not have social base or legitimacy to 
back up this voice.153 
The debate with regard to the nature of institutionalized 
participation is an old one, going back to discussions of the 
corporatist form of interest mediation during the 1970s. At that time 
the important distinction was made between “state corporatism” and 
“societal corporatism.” The former category includes those states 
who created new labor and business “corporations” out of whole 
cloth and controlled them from above.154 The latter category refers to 
those states in which previously existing labor and business groups 
negotiated their entrance into the state from a position of power.155 
A similar distinction can be made with respect to the 
institutionalization of civic engagement for accountability. When this 
institutionalization leaves the state with the power to divide, co-opt, 
and control civil society we have reached the problematic situation of 
“over-institutionalization,” or “statist institutionalization.”156 When it 
empowers previously existing societal actors to make their voices 
heard and to apply sanctions on misbehaving or ineffective 
governments, we have the much more productive case of what can be 
 
 151.  Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 459. 
 152.  Cf. id. (arguing that decentralization of government does not 
“automatically” improve government accountability). 
 153.  See id. (asserting that decentralization and the increase of local units, while 
bringing the government closer to its citizens, actually may reinforce inequalities).  
 154.  See Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV. 
POLITICS 85, 104–05 (1974) (defining state corporatism as connected to political 
systems in which local units are “tightly subordinated” to a central power). 
 155.  See id. (describing societal corporatism as “imbedded” in political systems 
with autonomous units).  
 156.  See Melish, supra note 110, at 71 (demonstrating former human rights 
approaches as responding to state infringements on individual liberties, resulting in 
a confrontational discourse). 
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called “societal institutionalization.”157 
In addition to being under-institutionalized, another risk is for pro-
accountability initiatives grounded in civic engagement to be “under-
involved” or too “externalist.” Consultations and workshops are 
common and protests and elections are frequent; but it is very 
difficult to find cases in which societal actors are “invited into the 
kitchen.”158 For instance, transparency laws often only give access to 
documents that report on concluded processes, not permitting 
citizens to have access to information about the process that led up to 
the decision or action.159 Governments usually claim the need to 
protect personal privacy and national security as their major reasons 
for resisting a policy of total transparency.160 Although this may 
often be the case, governments also frequently use such claims only 
as excuses to hide uncomfortable information from the public eye.161 
Nevertheless, there is a limit to the extent to which citizens as 
agents of accountability can be invited into the core of the state. 
Nuria Cunill Grau has stated that “[c]o-management is irreconcilable 
with control [and t]he efficacy of [social control] is directly 
dependent on the independence and the autonomy that societal actors 
 
 
maintain with respect to state actors.”162 According to this point of 
 
 157.  See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 458–
59 (asserting that reformers should focus on involving civil society earlier in the 
design of participatory mechanisms rather than waiting for the government to 
design the mechanisms in a top-down manner). 
 158.  See EBERLEI, supra note 135, at 3 (explaining that a majority of cases 
involve consultations and that collaborations, on the other hand, have been rare). 
See generally Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 
459. 
 159.  See John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global 
Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 99 (2006) 
(stating that most transparency and freedom of information laws are more 
restrictive). 
 160.  See id. at 101 (listing typical exemptions to freedom of information laws as 
including protection of national security, personal privacy, public security, 
commercial secrets, and internal deliberations).  
 161.  See id. at 105 (citing to other authorities to indicate that some governments 
act disingenuously when they allude to issues such as privacy and national 
security) (internal citations omitted). 
 162.  Nuria Cunill Grau, Responsabilización por el Control Social, CENTRO 
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view, pro-accountability initiatives based on civic engagement need 
to defend the autonomy of society. 
There is indeed a point at which individual citizens or civil society 
groups go so far into the state that they end up being consumed by 
the monster that they were supposed to control.163 Funding is a 
crucial issue here. Insofar as the government funds in a discretionary 
manner individuals and groups who are holding it accountable, their 
ability to exercise their pro-accountability function is 
compromised.164 
Nevertheless, we should not take this argument too far. An 
organization that receives resources from the government is not 
necessarily “bought off.” If resources are disbursed transparently and 
with the use of objective criteria the fear of cooptation is 
significantly reduced.165 The numerous existing public universities, 
public investigation commissions, and government-funded citizen 
councils demonstrate that public money and public criticism can go 
hand-in-hand. In addition, there are numerous ways in which societal 
actors can be invited inside the state without any money exchanging 
hands, including legal figures such as “social audits” and “citizen 
comptrollers.”166 The General, State, and District councils of 
Mexico’s Federal Election Institute are excellent examples of how 
societal actors can enforce accountability from within the state 
itself.167 
 
LATINOAMERICANO DE ADMINISTRACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO 6 (2000), 
available at http://www.defensoria.org.co/red/anexos/pdf/08/responsabilizacion 
_cs.pdf. 
 163.  See Henry Lucas et al., Research on the Current State of PRS Monitoring 
Systems 17 (Inst. of Dev. Studies, Discussion Paper No. 382, 2004), available at 
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Research-on-the-Current-State-
of-PRS-Monitoring-Systems.pdf (emphasizing that it is important for civil society 
organizations to maintain their autonomy and engage with government without 
conceding their values to prevent a loss of credibility in their roles as watchdogs 
over state actions). 
 164.  See id. at 20 (warning against joint-monitoring activities involving civil 
society organizations that are dependent on government funding, and suggesting, 
in the alternative, that external actors such as international NGOs may be more 
effective). 
 165.  See Ackerman, Co-Governance for Accountability, supra note 36, at 451 
(demonstrating, for example, that in the city of Porto Alegre, robust negotiations 
and a weighted voting system have ensured a fair distribution of resources). 
 166.  Id. at 451.  
 167.  Ackerman, Organismos Autónomos, supra note 89, at 12; see also 
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“Depth of involvement” is frequently related to “level of 
Institutionalization” insofar as the closer societal actors get to the 
core of the state, the more their behavior is usually regulated.168 But 
this is by no means a guarantee. Relatively external forms of 
participation, like public consultations of large infrastructure 
projects, can be required by law, while many civil society 
organizations or movements are able to reach into the very core of 
the state even without legal permission, as when informal but 
powerful bargaining tables are set up between guerrilla leaders and 
government officials.169 These are therefore two distinct dimensions 
and each needs to be given its due attention in the design of social 
accountability mechanisms. 
There is also a tendency for participatory pro-accountability 
mechanisms to only involve a small group of “well behaved” NGOs, 
middle class professionals, and centrist politicians.170 The unspoken 
fear is that the participation of broad-based grassroots movements, 
uneducated citizens, and leftist politicians will only make things 
more difficult. The fundamental problem here is one of 
communication and value sharing.171 On the one hand, 
communication with the “well behaved” group is much easier 
because they usually speak the same language, both literally and 
figuratively, and have often even studied at the same universities as 
the public officials. On the other hand, language, class, and cultural 
barriers make it much more difficult to truly listen to and understand 
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Policy and Mgmt., Discussion Paper No. 2011-03, 2011) (stating that the extent to 
which civil society organizations are involved in the “core” of government is 
different from the level of institutionalization as a result of the organizations’ goal 
of maintaining their autonomy). 
 169.  See Teresa La Porte, The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Non-State Actors 
and the Public Diplomacy Concept 1 (ISA Ann. Convention, 2012) (demonstrating 
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the “raucous” group.172 Clear proposals are often misinterpreted as 
destructive criticism and the need to be taken into account is 
frequently confused with a desire to disrupt. The simplest option is 
therefore to only open up participation to those one already 
understands. 
This is clearly a mistake. As Eberlei argues, “The circle of 
participating actors established must be gradually and systematically 
expanded, in order to broaden the scope of dialogue and make it 
largely inclusive,”173 Such broad-based participation is crucial for 
three reasons. First, civic engagement for accountability is usually 
more effective precisely when government officials do not know 
what to expect from civil society.174 When public officials and 
society actors form part of the same “epistemic community,” 
officials can anticipate exactly when, where, and how they will be 
observed, judged, and held accountable. Some level of predictability 
is positive insofar as it allows for coherent long-term planning.175 But 
too much predictability is dangerous insofar as it tends towards 
complicity.176 Social accountability can be most effective when it 
keeps government officials on their toes. 
Second, “well behaved” civil society groups are usually 
considered so because they “trust” government to do a good job.177 
Although some level of social trust in government is necessary for 
national cohesion, too much trust can be counterproductive. As 
Catalina Smulovitz has pointed out, it is often the case that “the 
social trust that results from value-sharing weakens citizens’ 
oversight and control capacities of what rulers do, and increases, in 
turn, the chances of opportunistic actions by one of them.”178 
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“Distrust” is one of the most powerful motivating forces for the 
vigilant observation of government and it is often the “raucous” 
groups that score high on this criteria.179 In the end, “autonomous 
civil society is [not so] important because citizens share values that 
sustain the benefits of self-restraint . . . [it] is important because it 
implies the existence of multiple external eyes with interests in the 
enforcement of law and denunciation of non-obedience.”180 
Third, pro-accountability initiatives that involve a wide range of 
interests and ideological positions are much more legitimate than 
those operated by a small, handpicked group of professionals.181 
Expanding the circle of participation is clearly a challenge, but it is 
the only way to achieve broad-based acceptance and ownership in 
such pro-accountability initiatives. We should be careful not to fall 
prey to depoliticized or neutral ideas of civil society that see 
“cooperative” or “moderate” forms of social organization as the only 
ones that can positively influence the construction of accountability 
arrangements.182 
In the end, we should question the commonly accepted idea that 
the absence of partisanship and political conflict is the only fertile 
ground for neutrality and accountability. Professionalism and 
independence are necessary but by no means sufficient to assure the 
long-term survival of accountability. To survive, pro-accountability 
structures need to be legitimated by society both at their founding 
moment and during their everyday operations.183 This requires the 
multiplication, not the reduction, of “external eyes” and the 
diversification, not unification, of political and ideological 
perspectives.184 Indeed, sometimes the most effective strategy for 
state reformers might be to stimulate dynamic social movements and 
social protest and let them take the lead in pressuring and 
undermining the power of recalcitrant elements of the state. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, I have argued in favor of a transformation of both 
the theory and practice of international anti-corruption and pro-
accountability reform. To implement successful strategies, we should 
break with the conventional wisdom based in a minimalist 
understanding of corruption and a bureaucratic approach to policy. In 
its place, we should develop new expansive visions of accountability 
and give particular emphasis to the role of civil society. Additionally, 
when considering society-based initiatives, the most fruitful strategy 
is to take up a human rights based approach. Otherwise, we risk 
running into the same problems that affect more traditional 
strategies. 
I began my discussion by proposing a new definition of 
accountability as a “pro-active process by which public officials 
inform about and justify their plans of action, their behavior and 
results and are sanctioned accordingly.” This definition breaks with 
the biases of understandings grounded in more elemental 
bureaucratic transparency and sets the stage for understanding 
corruption as a symptom of a breakdown of state-society relations 
instead of just due to administrative failure. In the first section, I also 
outlined the central failures of electoral democracy as an 
accountability mechanism. This is important to carve out theoretical 
space for developing innovative ways for citizens to participate in 
improving governance, beyond electoral participation. 
The following section then identified society-based accountability 
strategies within the broader schema of different administrative 
reforms. This was then immediately followed by an extensive 
discussion of the principal strengths and weakness of social 
accountability initiatives. To confront the weaknesses and build on 
the strengths, I propose focusing specifically on a series of key 
issues, including identifying government service providers as duty-
holders, understanding beneficiaries of government programs as 
citizens, valuing bottom-up participation, understanding the 
indivisibility of human rights, and engaging with the broader power 
structures. The challenge is to avoid using civil society to help 
government avoid its responsibilities and instead enable social 
mobilization to pressure government to operate more efficiently and 
effectively. 
